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I.

INTRODUCTION

As Taylor Swift fans entered the Rose Bowl to attend her concert in May of 2018,
they were met by a video display showing behind the scenes footage of Ms. Swift’s
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rehearsal and preparation for that night’s performance.1 Unbeknownst to her fans, these
displays were equipped with outward facing cameras that were capturing images of the
concert-goers’ faces.2 As the cameras collected the images, they were cross-referenced
against a database that consisted of photos of Taylor Swift’s known stalkers.3 It is unclear
whether any matches were made or, if there were matches, what became of the concertgoing Taylor Swift stalkers.4 However, it is clear that Facial Recognition Technology
deployed alongside security cameras continues to find new applications and new users.
The proliferation of cameras in America has made it practically impossible to enter
the public world without being caught on camera. Cameras are ubiquitous. Companies like
Ring5 and Nest6 market increasingly sophisticated cameras to residential consumers at a
growing rate, making residential and personal security cameras so widely available that
they are hardly noticeable in our world today. However, these cameras have created a new
vantage point into human activity that, until now, was hardly imaginable at any point in
history.
Recent advances in cloud computing, data storage, machine learning, and processing
power have brought about a revolution to security camera monitoring—Facial Recognition
Technology (“FRT”).7 Law enforcement agencies have begun adapting this technology to
serve policing purposes8—often forming ongoing relationships with the FRT providers.9
Like many new technologies, creative applications of FRT and unforeseen consequences
abound. These uses present new privacy threats to Americans and have almost no legal
precedent or framework through which to regulate and control use of this emerging
technology.10 Many scholars have advocated for legislation to ban FRT nationwide.11
However, many of the potential applications of FRT would, or do, lack a state actor and
fall outside the reach of constitutional protection. Accordingly, this comment seeks to
explore the relationship between law enforcement and FRT and argues that FRT is
1. Sophan Deb & Natasha Singer, Taylor Swift Said to Use Facial Recognition to Identify Stalkers, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/arts/music/taylor-swift-facialrecognition.html?module=inline.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Scott Raab, Why Taylor Swift Welcomed You to New York, ESQUIRE (Oct. 20, 2014)
https://www.esquire.com/entertainment/music/a30491/taylor-swift-1114/ (detailing the volume of kidnapping
and death threats, marriage proposals, and men who show up at Taylor Swift and her mother’s houses).
4. Deb, supra note 1.
5. RING, https://ring.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
6. NEST AWARE, https://store.google.com/us/product/nest_aware?hl=en-US (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
7. Jay
Stanley,
The
Dawn
of
Robot
Surveillance,
ACLU
1,
3
(2019),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/061819-robot_surveillance.pdf.
8. Drew Harwell, Oregon Became a Testing Ground for Amazon’s Facial-Recognition Policing. But What
if
Rekognition
Gets
It
Wrong?,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
30,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/30/amazons-facial-recognition-technology-issupercharging-local-police/.
9. See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
(documenting free trials for police departments and discounted annual licensing, as well as promoting FRT to
individual officers who would encourage procurement for the entire department).
10. See Stanley, supra note 7, at 44–45.
11. Hill, supra note 9 (quoting Woodrow Hartzog Professor of Law at Northeastern University, “I don’t see
a future where we harness the benefits of face recognition technology without the crippling abuse of the
surveillance that comes with it. The only way to stop it is to ban it.”).
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analogous to another technology to which the Court recently extended constitutional
protection.
The 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States is one of the few cases involving
individual privacy that the United States Supreme Court has decided in the twenty-first
century.12 The Carpenter decision dealt with a criminal defendant’s cell phone-generated
cell-site location information, which investigating law enforcement agents used to place
the defendant at the scene of multiple robberies scattered across multiple states. 13 The
defendant challenged law enforcement’s use of these records, and the Supreme Court
found in the defendant’s favor, concluding that the collection of these records constituted
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.14 This comment seeks to explore what the
Justices failed to address—the growing privacy threat that FRT adopted by law
enforcement agencies poses to Americans.15 Though the Supreme Court’s holding in
Carpenter strengthens individual privacy by expanding what constitutes a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment, the decision falls short of addressing modern privacy threats to
citizens by excluding law enforcement’s adoption of facial recognition technology on new
and existing surveillance camera networks. This comment argues that FRT deployed over
a wide area camera network presents the same threat as cell-site location information
presented in Carpenter and should also be protected from warrantless access or search by
law enforcement.
Part II of this comment details the Carpenter decision. A string of robberies in and
around Detroit, Michigan, drew the attention of state and federal law enforcement agents.
Their investigation led the law enforcement agents to pursue a suspect’s Cell-Site Location
Information. Ultimately the accessing of this data was reviewed by the Supreme Court.
This section reviews the Fourth Amendment precedent weighed by the Court and the
privacy concerns that led to the Court’s decision.
Part III introduces FRT and explores its application. This section briefly explains the
technological advances that led to the current capabilities and explores how FRT is
currently used and how the technology could be used as a tracking tool by law
enforcement. This part also discusses a potential application of the technology in the
United States by detailing its current use in China. Finally, this part argues that current and
future applications of FRT violate Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
Part IV applies the Carpenter test to FRT and explores the similarity between cellsite location information and the tracking potential of FRT. Finally, this section makes the
case against FRT in its current unregulated state and argues that applying the Carpenter
analysis to it renders government access of data created by FRT an unconstitutional
“search” that should be protected by the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
II.

CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME COURT UPDATES THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

Unbeknownst to most cell phone users, cell phones generate large volumes of
12.
13.
14.
15.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2222–23.
Id. at 2220.
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location specific, historical cell site location information.16 Regardless of whether a cell
phone is in use, it routinely transmits data to its wireless carrier if it is powered on.17 Cell
phones connect to nearby cell sites, which are radio antennas that receive and transmit
radio waves, connecting wireless cell phones to the carrier’s wired network. 18 Each time
a cell phone connects to a cell site, a record is created which, in aggregate, is called cell
site location information, or CSLI.19 CSLI records capture the cell phone identity, the cell
site the phone connected to, and the time of the connection. 20 Cell sites are commonly
mounted on a tower—a cell phone tower. However, in urban areas cell sites can be
mounted and integrated into light posts, flagpoles, buildings, and other urban fixtures. 21
The area a cell site covers depends upon the number of directional antennas installed and
the amount of traffic the cell site handles.22 As cell phone use and data consumption have
grown, cell site concentration has increased, which in turn, has caused a decrease in the
area each cell site covers.23 As cell site coverage area shrinks, CSLI grows more
accurate.24 Early cell phones only generated CSLI at the beginning of a phone call.25
However, as cell phone capabilities advance and grow, so too do the occasions to connect
to the network.26 Network communications range from sending or receiving a text message
to phone applications running routine connections.27 Increased cell phone connections and
shrinking cell site coverage areas have resulted in increasingly accurate, frequent, and
thorough CSLI collection.28

A. The Carpenter Decision Addressed a Tracking Tool that Most Individuals Carry in
Their Pockets—Cell Phones.
In 2011, Detroit police arrested four suspects in connection with a string of robberies
targeting Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores.29 After being taken into custody, one of the
suspects confessed that the group had robbed nine different stores across Ohio and
Michigan.30 The suspect implicated fifteen accomplices and provided the police with
several of their cell phone numbers.31 In addition, the FBI searched the suspect’s phone
and recovered cell phone numbers dialed around the time of each robbery.32 Using these

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2211.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12.
Id. at 2211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12.
Id.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2211–12.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
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cell phone numbers, prosecutors, working with the FBI, applied for and were granted court
orders to obtain cell phone records (from suspects) under the Stored Communications Act.
One of the suspects targeted by prosecutors was Timothy Carpenter.33 Based in part upon
the cell phone information obtained by the court orders, prosecutors charged Carpenter
with six counts of robbery and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of
violence.34 In addition to seven other suspects implicating Carpenter as the leader of the
robbery ring, the FBI used information from Carpenter’s cell phone to build a map that
placed Carpenter near the vicinity of four of the robberies at the time that they occurred.35
The information that the FBI used to build the map detailing Carpenter’s location at the
time of the robberies was cell site location information.36
Before the trial, Carpenter moved to have the CSLI data provided by wireless
carriers suppressed.37 Carpenter argued that the government had violated the Fourth
Amendment by seizing his CSLI records without a search warrant supported by probable
cause.38 To obtain a search warrant with probable cause, law enforcement must have
‘“some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or seizure may take place.”39
As mentioned, the Government had obtained the CSLI data through two court orders
issued by magistrate judges40 pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.41 The Act
requires the government to show that cell site evidence “might be pertinent to an ongoing
investigation.”42 The Court described this lower evidentiary burden utilized by the Stored
Communications Act as a ‘“gigantic’ departure from the probable cause rule.” 43 The first
court order sought 152 days’ worth of CSLI and actually returned 127 days of data. 44 The
second court order sought seven days’ worth of CSLI and actually returned two days of
data.45 In total, the Government compiled 129 days of Carpenter’s CSLI data—a total of
12,898 location points generated by Carpenter’s cell phone for an average of 101 location
points per day.46
The trial court denied Carpenter’s motion to suppress.47 At trial, the Government
used this data to produce maps of Carpenter’s location throughout the 129 day period,
including maps that placed him near four of the robberies Carpenter was charged with. 48
The accuracy of Carpenter’s precise location varied in “wedge shaped” sectors that ranged

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2212.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id.
Id. at 2221 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976)).
Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2221; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
Id.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2213.
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in size between one-eighth and four square miles.49 The Government relied on this data to
“clinch” the case.50 On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to permit
the CSLI data.51
B. A Majority of the Court Found Accessing CSLI to Be a Search Based on Concerns
Over Unprecedented Access and Information that Personal Data Grants Law
Enforcement
The Supreme Court broke new Fourth Amendment ground by holding that accessing
Carpenter’s CSLI data constituted a search. While addressing law enforcement access to
CSLI, the Supreme Court moved beyond existing Fourth Amendment precedent. The
Court rooted its analysis in the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, “to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials.”52 After the Court referenced basic precedential “guideposts,”53 it acknowledged
that CSLI maintained by a third party did not fit into any existing framework and instead
fell at the “intersection of two lines of cases.”54 The first line of cases addresses a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical movements and location.55 The second
line of cases concerns the degree of privacy an individual can expect in the information he
shares with others.56 Ultimately, however, the Court decided that an accurate Fourth
Amendment analysis of CSLI required a new test to accommodate digitally generated and
stored personal location information, breaking new ground in the realm of the 4th
Amendment.57
i. Privacy in Physical Movement and Location.
The first line of cases the Court considered to resolve CSLI privacy violations in
Carpenter addressed privacy in an individual’s location and movement. In United States
v. Knotts, the Government used a location beeper, the 1980s-era equivalent of a GPS
tracker, to track the vehicle of a suspect.58 The Government planted the beeper in a
container that wound up in the suspect’s vehicle. 59 Police used the beeper to measure the
distance from the vehicle and assist law enforcement to visually track and follow the
vehicle.60 The Court found that an individual travelling through public streets and
conveying their location to any observer had no expectation of privacy. 61 However, the

49. Id. at 2218.
50. Id. at 2213.
51. Id.
52. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967)).
53. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14.
54. Id. at 2214.
55. Id. at 2215.
56. Id. at 2216.
57. Id. at 2223.
58. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
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Court also observed that different constitutional principles would be implicated if this
pervasive form of tracking were available to follow a suspect around the clock. 62
More recently, the Court held that warrantless GPS tracking of a suspect’s vehicle
over a period of twenty-eight days constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.63 In
United States v. Jones, federal agents placed a GPS tracking device on the frame of a
suspect’s vehicle while the vehicle was parked at a public parking lot.64 Law enforcement
agents then used the GPS data to connect the suspect to a large drug conspiracy.65 After
receiving a life sentence, the defendant appealed the prosecution’s use of GPS surveillance
data at trial, which was procured without a warrant.66 The Court found it was a search, as
the Government had physically attached the GPS device to the suspect’s car67—consistent
with traditional Fourth Amendment property based notions of privacy.
Though the Court based its decision on property grounds, five justices concurred,
indicating that continuous, twenty-eight day monitoring constituted a search, despite the
tracked car’s movements being observable by the public, expanding the holding of
Jones.68 An intrusion into an individual’s privacy is considered a search when law
enforcement invades their reasonable expectation of privacy.69 The Court has recognized
a reasonable expectation of privacy where an individual “demonstrated an actual
expectation of privacy” and it is one “that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”70 In the Jones concurrences, two competing expectation of privacy theories
were advanced. Justice Alito wrote, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”71
While Justice Sotomayor found a search in law enforcement’s invasion of a “reasonable
societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” 72 Though these
concurrences differ, they both advocate a search where law enforcement deploys
“collective public monitoring over time.”73 Though the Court had found an expectation of
privacy in physical movements and location, the scale of CSLI data addressed in Carpenter
exceeded the scope of these cases.
ii. The Third-Party Doctrine.
Carpenter then shifted its focus to the ‘third-party doctrine,’ which provides that an

62. Id. (citing U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983)). In Knotts, the Court emphasized that the beeper
used to track the defendant was rudimentary and did not reveal the defendant’s movements completely, just those
he revealed by entering the roadway. By emphasizing the limited capabilities of the beeper, the Court left the
question of complete twenty-four hour tracking undecided. 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983).
63. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
64. Id. at 403.
65. Id. at 403–04.
66. Id. at 404.
67. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012)).
68. Id.; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
69. ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 401 (4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter COMPUTER CRIME].
70. Id. at 403.
71. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
73. COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 69, at 404.
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individual has no right to privacy for information that he voluntarily shares with a third
party.74 The doctrine is rooted in United States v. Miller.75 While investigating Miller for
tax fraud, the Government subpoenaed bank records and check stubs from Miller’s
banks.76 Miller challenged the Government’s collection of financial records as an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.77 Noting that Miller never had
“ownership or possession,”78 the Court found that Miller had a limited expectation of
privacy regarding the records because he had assumed the risk by sharing his personal
information with another person.79
The Supreme Court expanded the third-party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland, where
the Court held that an individual holds no reasonable expectation of privacy over phone
numbers they dial when they share them with their telephone company. 80 In both Miller
and Smith, the Court reasoned that the individuals in question had voluntarily shared their
personal information with third parties, and thus, they had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that information retained in the regular course of business by the respective
third-parties. But in contrast to these third-party doctrine cases, as the Court noted in
Carpenter, the nature of the data held by the cell phone providers is of a “qualitatively
different category” than call logs or bank records, which would suggest that the nature of
the information sought by law enforcement may affect the applicability of the third-party
doctrine.81
iii. Distinguishing the Privacy in Location and Third-Party Doctrines.
The Carpenter Court distinguished the Government’s collection of CSLI from GPS
tracking of physical movements and the third-party doctrine’s accessing of a third-party’s
records compiled in the regular course of business. Though accessing CSLI yields
information that is similar to information captured by GPS tracking of a vehicle, and the
third-party doctrine is implicated because CSLI is information used and collected by a
third-party wireless carrier, the nature of CSLI moved the Court beyond existing Fourth
Amendment doctrines.
Government acquisition of CSLI data presents a greater intrusion into individual
privacy than prior cases have addressed.82 Prior to Carpenter, the Supreme Court found
that individuals do not surrender their expectation of privacy by entering the public
sphere.83 This remains true for CSLI, but the information that data collected by CSLI
reveals is drastically more invasive than the prior-considered GPS information. CSLI
opens a “window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but
through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’” to
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
Id. at 2215 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
Id. at 2215 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
Id. (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
Id. at 2217.
Id.
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an even greater extent than GPS tracking previously had revealed about a suspect’s life. 84
The Court also recognized the extent to which cell phones have practically become a
“feature of the human anatomy,” enabling near perfect tracking of the cell phone’s
owner.85 Additionally, the Court observed that this “near perfect” form of surveillance can
be achieved with remarkable ease and is “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared
to traditional investigative tools.”86 Despite the many similarities between the locationrevealing nature of both GPS and CSLI data, the Court chose to treat the latter with a new
analysis that recognized the much more powerful location tracking capabilities of CSLI.
Another unique aspect of CSLI is what the Court called the “[r]etrospective quality
of the data.”87 The breadth of the historical record that CSLI data gives law enforcement
is unprecedented. Previously, law enforcement was limited in their investigatory power
both by time and the “dearth of records and the frailties of recollection.”88 This afforded
American citizens a form of privacy inherent in the relationship between citizens and law
enforcement. When an investigation commenced, law enforcement officials were limited
by what they could reconstruct from a witness’s memory and physical records and what
they could observe going forward from the start of the investigation. CSLI seems to
obliterate this check or limit on police power.
The Court distinguished CSLI from GPS; unlike GPS, with CSLI “police need not
even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.”89
Because CSLI is being “continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United
States,” when a criminal investigation is opened or a new suspect identified “[w]hoever
the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every day.” 90
Were the government allowed to access this information without a search warrant,
effectively everyone would be tailed, every day, with only their wireless carrier’s CSLI
data retention policy for protection. Considering the invasive nature of CSLI and its near
perfect surveillance capabilities, the Court held that when law enforcement accessed
Carpenter’s CSLI records, they “invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
the whole of his physical movements.”91
The Court explicitly declined to extend the third-party doctrine to cover CSLI.
Regarding CSLI, the Court held, “[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance
technology” to capture CSLI or obtains it from a wireless carrier as in Carpenter, “an
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI.”92 The Court’s willingness to extend Fourth
Amendment protection beyond CSLI collected and stored by wireless carriers to CSLI
captured directly by Government surveillance demonstrates how personal and revealing
the Court found CSLI data to be regardless of its source. The Court articulated that
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2218.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Id. at 2217
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obtaining CSLI from a wireless carrier is not “a garden-variety request for information
from a third-party witness.”93 The technology that captures CSLI represents a “seismic
shift in digital technology.”94 CSLI is a seismic shift because the data captured in CSLI is
“nearly infallible;” it is an “exhaustive chronicle of location information” and is collected
from everyone, not for a short period of time, but going back years. 95
The third-party doctrine partly derives from the idea that individuals have a reduced
expectation of privacy in information that they knowingly and voluntarily share with
another.96 However, the Court views detailed logs of an individual’s physical location,
compiled daily and stored for years, to be outside the scope of information covered by the
third-party doctrine.97 The nature of what CSLI reveals is simply too private. Significantly,
the Court rejected the argument that an individual voluntarily shares CSLI with their
wireless carrier. The Court did not see carrying a cell phone as a true choice, as cell phones
are such an integral part of day-to-day life that “carrying one is indispensable to
participation in modern society.”98
Most importantly to individual privacy concerns, the Court noted the inescapable
nature of the CSLI collection, observing that there is no way to “[a]void leaving behind a
trail of location data.”99 Cell phones generate CSLI without any “affirmative act on the
part of the user beyond powering up” the phone by receiving calls, texts, and checking for
application updates.100 Thus, the Court concluded that the user could not assume the risk
of turning over CSLI voluntarily. Even though the Government obtained Carpenter’s CSLI
from a third party, this “does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection,” against government searches.101 Accordingly, the Court found “[t]he
Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment”102 and held that law enforcement must secure a search warrant in
order to access CSLI.103
iv. New Factors Considered by the Court to Protect CSLI Under the Fourth
Amendment.
In addition to the consideration of previous Fourth Amendment doctrines, the Court
based its decision, at least in part, on features unique to CSLI and future capabilities of the
technology. With an eye toward the future, the Court observed that “the rule the Court
adopts ‘must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.’”104 The Court’s position was likely affected by the fact that it was

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 2219.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Id.
Id. at 2222.
Id. at 2218–19 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
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considering events that took place in 2011 from a vantage point seven years later in 2018.
However, there is a sense in the opinion that the Court was giving consideration to future
advances beyond simply acknowledging the time that had passed since Carpenter’s CSLI
was accessed. As University of California Law Professor and Fourth Amendment scholar,
Orrin Kerr, notes, one of the best examples of the Court’s willingness to imagine future
iterations of the capabilities of CSLI data is the discrepancy of the facts of the Carpenter
investigation and the purported location tracking capabilities of CSLI data in the Court’s
opinion.105 The CSLI evidence presented against Carpenter at trial placed him at the
robbery locations with varied degrees of accuracy ranging from areas of one-eighth of a
square mile to four square miles.106 However, the Court discussed the ability of wireless
carriers to pinpoint a cell phone’s location within fifty meters.107 The Court used the threat
of CSLI accuracy to bolster its argument that this technology should be protected from the
government by the requirement of a search warrant. Though Kerr is critical of the
discrepancy,108 the Court is right to be concerned by inevitable advancements in the
capabilities of CSLI. The Court’s willingness to consider present or near future
technological capabilities is necessary in light of the staggering amount of personal data
generated, collected, and stored in today’s world.109 The Court rightly takes some latitude
in addressing a technology that has the potential to track every American carrying a cell
phone around the clock.
C. The Carpenter Test
The Court held that CSLI is protected under the Fourth Amendment because of the
“deeply revealing nature of CSLI;” its “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach;” and the
“inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”110 This test reveals the factors the
Court found to be the most repugnant to the Fourth Amendment’s right to freedom from
unwarranted searches. First, CSLI data is “deeply revealing.”111 The Court was concerned
about the volume of information that can be gleaned from accessing a person’s CSLI
data—a lot.112 Second, CSLI captures a “comprehensive” record of a cell phone user’s
life.113 As the Court discussed, cell phones have become part of the human anatomy;
essentially everyone has one, and almost everyone carries it wherever they go. 114 Third,
cell phones automatically collect a user’s location data without a meaningful alternative
for the user. The Court acknowledged that there is no meaningful choice to opt-out of
CSLI collection. The only real way to avoid generating CSLI is to turn off the cell phone
105. Orin
S.
Kerr,
Implementing
Carpenter
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
14–15),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257.
106. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
107. Id. at 2219.
108. Kerr, supra note 105, at 14–15.
109. Michael Kwet, The Rise of Smart Camera Networks, and Why We Should Ban Them, THE INTERCEPT
(Jan. 27, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/01/27/surveillance-cctv-smart-camera-networks/; The
Great Hack (Netflix July 24, 2019).
110. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2218.
113. Id. at 2223.
114. Id. at 2218.
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or go without it, which, the Court has already conceded is an unreasonable expectation.115
The Court, in going beyond previous case law and identifying new characteristics to weigh
in determining whether data generated by a new technology ought to be protected from
government search absent a warrant, seems to signal that there are technologies that
present such a great threat or undermine individual privacy to such an extreme that they
fall under Fourth Amendment protection, despite who holds the actual records.116
Part of the Carpenter test also captures an awareness that the test ‘“must take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’”117 This is
accomplished by considering the advancements that CSLI technology has made in the time
since the robberies occurred. The factors the test considers also reveal that justices in the
majority recognized the significance of the threat to individual privacy presented by CSLI
and other similar technologies. In fact, this threat is what pushed the majority to articulate
a new test—the threat to privacy that big data generated by technology creates. Before
articulating the test, the Court seemed to be self-aware of its own inability to address headon the persistent privacy concerns that new technology, like CSLI, will present. 118 Despite
the Court’s desire to limit its decision to the facts before it, its reluctance to engage other
technology-enabled privacy threats leaves doubt for law enforcement regarding how to
apply the Carpenter test to emerging technologies in the future.
III. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY CAMERAS, AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court declined to extend its holding to “conventional
surveillance techniques and tools,”119 insisting that its decision to require a warrant when
law enforcement accessed encyclopedic-like location information held by a third party was
a “narrow one.”120 However, the Carpenter analysis should be applied to another
emerging technology—one capable of more invasive and revealing data collection—facial
recognition technology (“FRT”).121 Specifically, the Carpenter analysis should be applied
to FRT deployed on surveillance camera networks.
A. Incorporating Facial Recognition Technology on Existing Security Cameras
FRT, the ability of a computer to recognize a face, relies on “machine vision,” which
is the ability of a computer to analyze video input received from a camera. 122 Simply put,
it gives a computer to the ability to see. Machine vision has enabled an array of advances
in technology in recent years and has become ubiquitous in modern life. 123 Examples of

115. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
116. Id. at 2222.
117. Id. at 2220 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
118. Id. at 2220 n.4.
119. Id. at 2220.
120. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
121. Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the United States, GEO. L.
CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.americaunderwatch.com/ [hereinafter Garvie, America
Under Watch].
122. Stanley, supra note 7, at 9.
123. Id.
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machine vision applications include copyright enforcement, self-driving cars, Snapchat
filters, and facial recognition.124 Progress in machine vision has been enabled and
accelerated by artificial intelligence, or the ability of a computer to learn.125 Artificial
intelligence not only allows a computer to recognize faces but also to register human
behavior and perceive human emotion.126 Artificial intelligence enables FRT and also
powers other forms of video analytics.127
The United States contains more video surveillance cameras per capita than any
other country in the world.128 Studies suggest that the total number of cameras in the
United States was around 40 million in 2014.129 Though this number is staggering, it has
undoubtedly continued to rise as technology has improved, costs have sunk, and ease of
access to cameras has improved.130 Despite the number of cameras, the video captured by
surveillance cameras has remained siloed and difficult to analyze. Cameras and camera
networks were, and for the most part remain, isolated between public and private entities,
like large corporations and small businesses, or municipal and city governments and the
federal government.131 In addition, most video is never watched, both because it contains
nothing of interest and because, as Department of Justice experts have noted, live
monitoring of such video is both extremely “boring” and “mesmerizing.”132 Reviewing
surveillance footage or live monitoring a camera feed is also difficult. One study found
that “[a]fter only 20 minutes of watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of
most individuals has degenerated well below acceptable levels.”133 Though an individual
might be captured by any number of cameras across an array of applications, monitoring
and analyzing captured video remains difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.134
However, as FRT develops, it has the potential to unlock video that was previously
inaccessible to review.
FRT does not operate in isolation; it relies on some form of input of images, typically
from video cameras.135 This relationship can be thought of as a surveillance video camera
capturing images as the “eyes” and FRT processing the captured images as the “brain.”136
Thus, surveillance cameras observe and gather information while FRT analyzes the
information. In 2012, Senator Al Franken described facial recognition technology as

124. Id.
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id. at 6.
127. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 7, at 4.
128. Id. at 3 n.3.
129. Id.
130. Stanley, supra note 7, at 3; see Megan Wollerton, The era of the $200 security camera is over, C-NET
(July 5, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/the-era-of-the-200-security-camera-is-over/ (discussing the
developing trend in low cost home security cameras).
131. Stanley, supra note 7, at 4.
132. Mary W. Green, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, NAT’L
INST. JUST. 178265 (Sept. 30, 1999), https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/appropriate-and-effective-usesecurity-technologies-us-schools.
133. Id.
134. Stanley, supra note 7, at 4.
135. Id. at 3; VICE News, How China Tracks Everyone, YOUTUBE (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLo3e1Pak-Y.
136. Stanley, supra note 7, at 3.
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creating a digital “faceprint;” similar to a fingerprint, the faceprint is “a unique file
describing your face.”137 Like fingerprints, unidentified faceprints are referenced against
a database of identified faceprints to create a match. This fingerprint metaphor is a helpful
starting place for understanding the capabilities of FRT.
Broadly, FRT is a computer-based program that is capable of scanning an image or
video of anonymous persons to identify the faces captured in the image or video frame.138
FRT is able to recognize faces, scan the face down to the individual pixel, locate and
catalog facial features as identifying markers, and create a template of the unknown
face.139 The markers on a template consist of measurements of the face, like the distance
between eyes, or the width of the nose.140 These measurements “make a face unique.”141
FRT also identifies “nodal points,” or facial landmarks, and their measurements in relation
to the face as a whole.142 The newly generated template, also referred to as a “face
signature” or a “map” of the unidentified face is matched against existing identified image
databases.143 Identified image databases range from private collections of images, like
known Taylor Swift stalkers,144 to public collections like states’ driver’s license databases
or the national passport database.145
Privately held identified image collections can be as comprehensive as the databases
held by the government. Facebook’s 2010 feature “tag suggestions” was powered using
facial recognition technology.146 Tag suggestions enabled Facebook to help a user identify
friends in photos the user uploaded, making it easier for the user to tag their friends in
photos.147 As a result, Facebook’s database of “face templates” 148 or “faceprints” is
thought to be the largest in the world, as Facebook had 800 million users in 2010.149 Once
an individual’s face template has been created, Facebook is able to identify that individual
in any other photograph uploaded onto the platform by any Facebook user, regardless of
that individual’s awareness or consent.150 Though Facebook users are able to opt out of
the tag suggestions feature, the function must be disabled manually.151
Through use of FRT, identification can be made both in real time and in
retrospect.152 Real-time scanning has been used to screen fans at sporting events. For

137. What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Privacy Technology and the Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012)
(statement of Senator Al Franken) [hereinafter Hearing].
138. Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2019, at 9.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id.
141. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019).
142. Hamann, supra note 138, at 10.
143. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1268.
144. Deb, supra note 1.
145. Hamann, supra note 138, at 9.
146. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1268.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Hearing, supra note 137, at 2.
150. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1273.
151. Hearing, supra note 137, at 2.
152. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Face
Recognition in America (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/risk-framework. (“If cities like
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example, in 2019, police in Wales used cameras attached to police vans to screen
spectators on their way to a rugby match.153 Police used a database of mug shots as a
matching reference and monitored the system in real-time.154 Conversely, FRT is also
creating new retrospective capabilities to store and summarize surveillance footage.155
FRT automates the indexing and storing of collected video, which will allow a human
viewer to search existing video or review a summarized compilation.156 Video search and
summarization addresses the gap, or gulf, between the amount of recorded video that is
created and the difficulty and cost of analyzing it. 157 There are a number of different
methods to summarize video. However, they all seek to capture and emphasize important
events, like license plate numbers, faces of people that walk through a specified area, cars,
or any imaginable criteria.158 Within a matter of minutes, a lightly traveled road or
walkway can be summarized by showing each person or car that traveled through that area
over the course of several hours or days.159 With the advent of cloud storage, amassing
and storing a large volume of video is no longer limited to large, “deep-pocketed
organizations” with a high level of expertise.160 FRT’s tracking capabilities will continue
to improve as software is perfected, cost of implementation drops, and cameras become
more prevalent.161
B. Current FRT Applications Demonstrate the Technology’s Powerful Tracking
Potential
Though comprehensive location tracking, surveillance, and identification seem like
something from a “dystopian dream”162 of the future, it is becoming a reality around the
world.163 As of 2020, China has the most prolific application of FRT for purposes of state
surveillance, specifically the deployment of FRT in the Xianjing region in the
southwestern part of China. Xianjing is home to the Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim minority
Chicago equip their full camera networks with face recognition, they will be able to track someone’s movements
retroactively or in real-time, in secret, and by using technology that is not covered by the warrant requirements
of existing state geolocation privacy laws”).
153. Adam Satariano, Real-Time Surveillance Will Test the British Tolerance for Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/technology/britain-surveillanceprivacy.html?searchResultPosition=2.
154. Id.
155. Stanley, supra note 7, at 28.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 28–29.
159. Id. at 29.
160. Stanley, supra note 7, at 11.
161. See Lola Fadulu, Facial Recognition Technology in Public Housing Prompts Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/facial-recognition-technology-housing.html.
162. Paul Mozur, Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html [hereinafter Mozur,
Inside China].
163. The Daily: The Chinese Surveillance State, Part 1, N.Y. TIMES, (May 6, 2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/podcasts/the-daily/china-surveillance-uighurs.html [hereinafter Chinese
Surveillance Part 1] (using facial recognition software for ethnic profiling and social control); The Daily: The
Chinese
Surveillance
State,
Part
2,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(May
7,
2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/podcasts/the-daily/china-uighurs-internment-camps-surveillance.html
[hereinafter Chinese Surveillance Part 2].
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numbering approximately eleven million people.164 Authorities in this region have
adopted mass surveillance and identification as a tool in their effort to convert a longoccupied Muslim region into a more Chinese influenced and controlled area. 165 In recent
years, police have turned to facial recognition technologies to assert control and
monitoring over the Uighurs.
In this region of China, being recorded on camera and identified by FRT is not
merely a risk upon venturing out in public, it is a certainty. In Guiyang, a “vast” and
“sophisticated” camera system encompasses the city.166 The system, which uses FRT and
artificial intelligence to analyze video input, is able to locate and identify anyone who
ventures into public within a matter of minutes.167 Police can monitor citizens in real time
and are also able to review a suspect’s past movement as far back as a week.168 Though
authorities are using facial recognition technology to target persons with a criminal past,
police are also programming the facial recognition system to track the Muslim Uighurs
based on their distinctive skin tone and facial features.169 The dataset used to program the
distinction between ethnic groups is a set of pictures identified as either the Muslim
minority or the ethnic Chinese.170 The artificial intelligence is fed these identified pictures
and is programmed, or learns, to distinguish between the two groups.171 This enables
Chinese authorities to target the Uighurs by identifying them and tracking their movement
and activity, as well as who they associate with, both in real time and in retrospect.
Though the Chinese Government is responsible for this surveillance and monitoring,
it has been enabled by Chinese technology companies. 172 There are at least four major
Chinese technology companies working to develop the technology for China’s facial
recognition systems, and each company is individually valued at over one billion
dollars.173 Companies working on China’s surveillance camera networks have benefitted
greatly from the Government’s 2018 promise to invest billions of dollars in
surveillance.174 Indeed, one Chinese FRT company, MegVii, received a half a billion
dollar investment in 2019, much of which came from a State operated venture capital
fund.175 These companies have helped facilitate the Government’s targeting of the
Uighurs and other non-Chinese ethnic minorities in China.176 However, these minority

164. Chinese Surveillance Part 2, supra note 163.
165. Chinese Surveillance Part 1, supra note 163.
166. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligenceracial-profiling.html [hereinafter Mozur, Face Scans].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Zak Doffman, Has Huawei’s Darkest Secret Just Been Exposed By This New Surveillance Report?,
FORBES (Nov. 29, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/11/29/has-huaweis-darkest-secret-justbeen-exposed-by-this-new-report/#277a4e1a4061.
173. Mozur, Face Scans, supra note 169.
174. Id.
175. VICE
News,
How
China
Tracks
Everyone,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
23,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLo3e1Pak-Y.
176. Mozur, Face Scans, supra note 169.
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tracking capabilities are marketed as the technology’s ability to recognize “sensitive
groups of people.”177 Despite marketing efforts to dilute the potent potential of facial
recognition technology, the Chinese Government remains open about how it is using facial
recognition technology.178
Part of China’s surveillance strategy is to conduct the surveillance in public.
Billboards show video, captured by security cameras running FRT, of offenders jay
walking, or committing other minor offenses and display the identity of the offender in
public places for others to note and observe.179 These billboards and the Government’s
surveillance capabilities are publicly known and often overstated, as the perception of
surveillance is also a useful tool.180 Coupled with China’s growing FRT capabilities, the
country has launched the pilot of a social credit score program.181 The program aims to
track all Chinese citizens using big data, cameras, and FRT to award a score based on an
individual’s behavior.182 In 2018, China’s National Public Credit Information Center
reported that over seventeen million people with low social scores were barred from
purchasing plane tickets.183 While the full effects of China’s adoption of FRT remain
unclear, the present privacy and human rights conditions in China should serve as a
warning as FRT continues to promulgate in the United States. Though China contains
about four times the number of surveillance cameras as the United States—about 200
million cameras, with the goal of increasing that number to 600 million in the coming
years184—the United States has a growing list of camera networks.185 These are networks
on which FRT could be readily deployed.186
C. Banning Facial Recognition Technology
In the United States, reception to FRT has been mixed. Some state and municipal
governments have responded to the effects of FRT by banning government use of the
technology. San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, and Somerville, Mass., have all banned
municipal government—including police—use of FRT.187 On a larger scale, the state of
177. Id.
178. Mozur, Inside China, supra note 162.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Divya Chowdhury & Neha Malara, Reports of ‘Big Brother’ China Social Credit System Untrue: AI
Expert Xue Lan, REUTERS, (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-lan/reports-of-bigbrother-china-social-credit-system-untrue-ai-expert-xue-lan-idUSKBN1ZL2P9; see also Black Mirror:
Nosedive (Netflix original series released Oct. 21, 2016) (portraying a dystopian society where every individual
rates their interaction with others on a scale of one to five to generate a social score. An individual’s social score
is visible to all people who they interact with.).
182. VICE
News,
How
China
Tracks
Everyone,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
23,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLo3e1Pak-Y.
183. Id.; Joe McDonald, China bars millions from travel for ‘social credit’ offenses, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 22,
2019), https://apnews.com/9d43f4b74260411797043ddd391c13d8.
184. VICE
News,
How
China
Tracks
Everyone,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
23,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLo3e1Pak-Y.
185. Mozur, Inside China, supra note 162.
186. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
187. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, What Happens When Employers Can Read Your Facial
Expressions?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/opinion/facial-recognitionban.html.
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California has considered banning FRT in police-worn body cameras,188 and in Europe,
European Union officials have begun considering a total ban of FRT. 189 Meanwhile, in
Florida, law enforcement has embraced FRT and its potential to identify criminal
suspects.190 In 2001, Florida became the first state to adopt FRT and later helped the FBI
develop its own system.191 It appears that Florida is not using FRT for wide area
surveillance but instead for suspect identification (scanning a picture of an unidentified
suspect with FRT), running an estimated 8,000 matches per month. 192
The San Francisco ordinance contains the reasoning for the ban: “[t]he propensity
for facial recognition technology to endanger civil rights and civil liberties substantially
outweighs its purported benefits . . . and the technology will exacerbate racial injustice and
threaten our ability to live free of continuous government monitoring.” 193 Studies have
shown that FRT is significantly less accurate when scanning the faces of people of color
and women.194 Fairness and civil rights concerns are just some of the many issues raised
by those who advocate for a total ban of FRT. In addition, proponents of a total ban of
FRT argue that the lack of transparency and rules around the application of the technology
justify banning it.195 In Europe, the European Commission is considering a five-year ban
of FRT to develop policy to prevent abuse and to improve regulation around data and
privacy rights.196 While the contemplation of a total ban is outside the scope of this
comment, many of the same arguments for a total ban bolster the need to have FRT
information protected by the search warrant requirement.
IV. APPLYING CARPENTER TO FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
FRT deployed over a camera network covering a wide area represents a similar, if
not a more severe, threat to individual privacy than the threat posed by CSLI in Carpenter.
For that reason, accessing of FRT should be considered a search and should be protected
by the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, wide area camera
networks which are integrated with a facial recognition system. The threat requires two
components: first, wide area camera networks, which require a physical infrastructure to
feed data to; second, a facial recognition system, monitoring and compiling the input for
real-time or historical analysis. Imagine a major walkable American city, where cameras
proliferate every intersection, store front, parking lot, neighborhood entrance, apartment

188. Reis Thebault, California Could Become the Largest State to Ban Facial Recognition in Body Cameras,
WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/12/california-couldbecome-largest-state-ban-facial-recognition-body-cameras/.
189. Facial Recognition: EU Considers Ban of Up to Five Years, BBC (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51148501.
190. Aaron Mak, Facing Facts: A Case in Florida Demonstrates the Problems with Using Facial Recognition
to Identify Suspects in Low-Stakes Crimes, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2019) https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/facialrecognition-arrest-transparency-willie-allen-lynch.html.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Shirin Ghaffary, San Francisco’s facial recognition technology ban, explained, VOX (May 14, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/14/18623897/san-francisco-facial-recognition-ban-explained.
194. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121; Fadulu, supra note 161.
195. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
196. EU Considers Ban, supra note 189.
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building, subway station, and bus stop. An individual moving about a city with a wide area
camera network could be easily and accurately tracked as they travel, getting picked up by
different cameras. Passing beneath the lens of a single camera would not reveal much
about an individual’s daily activity. However, as the number of cameras that an individual
encounters increases, so too does the amount of information about the individual that can
be gleaned from the camera footage. Cities like New York City, Washington D.C.,
Chicago, Detroit, and Orlando are all examples of major population centers with the first
component—wide area camera networks—already in place.197
The surveillance model in Detroit, Michigan, named Project Green Light, is the most
alarming.198 The Detroit Police Department (“DPD”) and the City of Detroit have created
a system where law enforcement can access live video from cameras located in businesses,
health clinics, apartment buildings, and schools.199 The program’s initial goal was to deter
crime at high traffic businesses open during late-night hours.200 Since its inception, the
program has grown substantially.201 In 2019, Detroit’s mayor proposed to expand the
camera network and coverage by adding hundreds of traffic light cameras.202 The
combination of cameras in private businesses and public spaces would allow police to
“track any shooter or carjacker across the city.”203 All Project Green Light cameras, no
matter where they are located, transmit back to a control center monitored by the DPD.204
DPD also has access to the driver’s license database.205 Regardless of the specifics of the
second component—the facial recognition system and its capabilities, or how the video
input is cataloged and how long it is stored206—Detroit has laid the foundation for a
tracking system capable of following the people of Detroit almost anywhere they go,
around the clock. This program is not hidden from the public, as locations with a
participating camera have green lights installed to alert visitors that they are being
monitored.207 In theory, an individual could avoid visiting participating businesses and

197. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
198. Agreements: Memorandum of Understanding Project Green Light Agreement, CITY OF DETROIT,
https://detroitmi.gov/departments/police-department/project-green-light-detroit#block-views-block-relatedlinks-block-1 (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) [hereinafter Project Green Light Agreement].
199. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
200. Id.
201. Francis X. Donnelly, Project Green Light Welcomes 500th Business, THE DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 11,
2019), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2019/03/11/project-green-light-welcomes500th-business/3132789002/.
202. Amy Harmon, As Cameras Track Detroit’s Residents, a Debate Ensues Over Racial Bias, N.Y. Times,
(July 8, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/detroit-facial-recognition-cameras.html. [hereinafter
Harmon, Racial Bias].
203. Id.; see also Click on Detroit | Local 4 | WDIV, 2019 Detroit State of the City address, YOUTUBE (Mar.
5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXAZoMCl3qs (the Mayor’s 2019 State of the City Address,
promising hundreds of more video cameras at city intersections).
204. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
205. Id.
206. Project Green Light Agreement, supra note 198 (“Storage: At the Owner’s sole cost and expense, the
Owner will ensure that footage from all cameras at that Owner’s Covered Business(es) is stored on an Axis
approved SD/SDHC card, and for at least thirty (30) days via a network-attached storage device (“NAS”) or
cloud-based storage that will be compatible with DPD’s surveillance software provider.”).
207. Harmon, supra note 202.
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locations. However, Detroit currently has thousands of cameras deployed208 with plans to
install hundreds more, everywhere from traffic lights209 to public housing.210 Does a
Detroit resident have a meaningful alternative to being filmed should they choose to avoid
Project Green Light cameras?
Examples like the tracking of the Uighurs in China and the camera networks in the
United States demonstrate the tracking ability, or potential tracking ability, of a facial
recognition system fed by a wide-area camera network. However, the length of video
retention remains a variable—that is, how far back in time FRT would be able to scan for
an individual’s face. However, it doesn’t seem like a stretch to assume that once the video
is collected, the party responsible for its collection will have an interest in retaining this
data for a period of weeks or months at the minimum to be able to search the historical
record.211 This would give law enforcement, or third parties collecting this data, the ability
to track a person’s activity continuously within a surveilled area like a city. When law
enforcement uses FRT to track an individual in real-time or search a database of video for
a person’s past activity (whether held by a third party or collected by the government), this
action should constitute a search and fall under the protection of the Fourth Amendment’s
search warrant requirement.
A. Applying the Carpenter Test to FRT
In Carpenter, the Court considered a long list of characteristics that influenced its
decision to hold that using a cell phone and accompanying CSLI records to track a suspect
over an extended period of time violated the Fourth Amendment.212 However, the Court
highlighted three characteristics in concluding its opinion: (1) “the deeply revealing
nature” of the collected information; (2) the information’s “depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach;” and (3) “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.”213
In addition to this test, the Court expressed that the cell phone being used to track Carpenter
was “almost a ‘feature of the human anatomy.’”214 By comparing CSLI and FRT and
evaluating FRT through the Carpenter test, it is clear that tracking an individual using FRT
raises the same constitutional concerns that CSLI raised in Carpenter.
i. Deeply Revealing Nature
The first factor of the Carpenter test focuses on the nature of the information being
searched itself, rather than how the information was generated or the method used to
collect it.215 As professor Paul Ohm notes, this factor of the test protects information only

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
211. See generally Lucas Mearian, CW@50: Data storage goes from $1M to 2 cents per gigabyte,
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3182207/cw50-data-storage-goesfrom-1m-to-2-cents-per-gigabyte.html (detailing the falling cost of data storage).
212. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 370 (2019).
213. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
214. Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
215. Id. at 2223; Ohm, supra, note 212, at 371.
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if it is ‘“deeply revealing’ of some private quality of the person under surveillance.” 216
Professor Ohm argues that this factor represents a significant break from previous Fourth
Amendment analysis because it centers on the collected information rather than what was
done to collect it or prevent its collection.217 The Carpenter test considers what the
collected information reveals rather than the manner in which the information is
collected.218 This shift is preceded by two ideas articulated by precedent: first, that
location information ought to be protected because it shows “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations;”219 and second, that cell phones “hold for
many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’”220
Location information collected by FRT meets the criteria of the first factor of the
Carpenter test. FRT is capable of collecting deeply intimate information about an
individual’s life. As discussed above, cameras paired with FRT are currently in use to track
Uighurs in all facets of their lives.221 In Detroit, Michigan, private property owners have
the option to purchase cameras that are connected to Detroit’s Project Green Light. These
cameras feed directly to the Detroit Police Department for monitoring.222 Some of the
locations participating in the program include schools, churches, and health clinics.223
Outdoor cameras alone that monitor the exterior of these locations would generate deeply
revealing information. Any individual who entered a school, church, or clinic would be
recorded and memorialized. Monitoring would reveal persons who entered these places.
But consider internal or indoor cameras, as the Green Light program mandates, which
would reveal even more.224 Internal cameras would expose what an individual did inside:
whether they stayed in the waiting room of the clinic or received treatment from a care
provider; picked up a child from school or voted in an election in the gymnasium; attended
worship in the sanctuary or dropped off food at the church’s food pantry. It would all be
captured and potentially stored. The information collected by security cameras clearly
reveals intimate details of life. FRT threatens to capture and catalog this information to
make it more accessible and revealing to law enforcement. For many, our day to day
activity reveals the privacies of life.225 Because the video recorded, cataloged and
searchable by FRT, has a “deeply revealing nature,” it meets the first factor of the
Carpenter test.
ii. Depth, Breadth, and Comprehensive Reach
The second factor of the Carpenter test centers on the “depth, breadth, and

216. Ohm, supra note 212, at 371.
217. Id.
218. Kerr, supra note 105, at 1.
219. Ohm, supra note 212, at 371 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
220. Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (2014)).
221. Mozur, Face Scans, supra note 169.
222. Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121.
223. Harmon, supra note 202 (project green light locations include apartment buildings, churches, and
schools); Garvie, America Under Watch, supra note 121 (project green light locations included fifteen health
clinics).
224. Project Green Light Agreement, supra note 198.
225. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
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comprehensive reach” of the information collected.226 This three-part factor ultimately
evaluates the “quantity of information stored.”227 One way to illustrate this factor is to
imagine a spreadsheet or a table of information. The vertical columns represent the
different types of information gathered, like the timestamp of when a record was created,
the location or where it was created, and who was identified. The horizontal rows would
each represent a single record. In Carpenter, a new row was created each time Carpenter’s
cell phone connected to a cell tower; the captured information included a timestamp of
when a cell phone connected to the nearest cell phone tower (time), the location of that
tower (place), and the cell phone number (identity).228 The greater the volume of the
information contained in this spreadsheet—in terms of columns and rows—the greater the
protection it deserves from government search.
Depth refers to time; the longer an individual has been tracked, the more records
have been generated and the greater the depth of the information collected.229 In
Carpenter, the CSLI in question spanned five years (because the wireless carrier arbitrarily
chose a five-year retention policy),230 but investigators had requested 127 days’ worth of
the data.231 However, in a footnote, the Court observed, “[i]t is sufficient for our purposes
today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.”232 Although this does not completely clarify the issue of the length of time
required to trigger a search, it served as a strong reference point. 233
Breadth refers to the frequency at which the data is collected.234 The more frequently
datapoints are created, the greater the “breadth” of the data. Both “breadth” and “depth”
contribute to the quantity of information that is collected, as the more frequently data is
collected, over a longer period of time, the more complete a picture of an individual’s life
the data paints.235
Comprehensive reach refers to “the number of people tracked in a database.”236 In
Carpenter, the Court observed that “location information is continually logged for all of
the 400 million devices in the United States,” and that “this newfound tracking capacity
runs against everyone.”237 “Comprehensive reach” not only means that the data collection
indiscriminately affects everyone, but also that it is constantly created, revealing a
comprehensive record of an individual’s life.
FRT meets this factor and its subparts. Like CSLI, the nature of the information
226. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
227. Ohm, supra note 212, at 372.
228. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225.
229. Other scholars argue that “depth” refers to “detail and precision of the information stored.” Ohm, supra
note 212, at 372. However, this makes an already tricky test—three factors with multiple sub-parts—
unnecessarily burdensome to apply. The test ought to remain as clear and straightforward to apply as possible.
230. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2217 n.3.
233. Ohm, supra note 212, 374–75 (“The Court gave no principled reason for selecting seven days as the cutoff, so we ought not consider it the precise dividing line. Future opinions will need to analyze the relationship
between the temporal breadth of data and the impact on privacy interests.”)
234. Ohm, supra note 212, at 372.
235. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
236. Ohm, supra note 212, at 373.
237. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
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collected by FRT deployed over a wide area camera network is of a sufficient “depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach” to warrant protection from law enforcement. Security
cameras capture video constantly, and the limits on storage capacity are vast. This means
that camera feeds can be stored permanently and accessed at a later date to be searched for
a suspect or target. Thus, there is practically no limit to the “depth” of the information
collected. The “breadth” of FRT, while not as complete as CSLI, is sufficient to be
protected from search by law enforcement. The frequency with which an individual is
identified, or seen, by a camera depends on the saturation of cameras in a certain area. In
the cities mentioned above, the frequency of being captured on camera is high. For
example, an individual living in New York City who relies on the subway for their daily
commute to work would be captured frequently just going about their day. 238 The
“comprehensive reach” of FRT is similar to that of CSLI. Like CSLI, FRT is constantly
collecting data and indiscriminately captures virtually everyone who walks in front of a
camera. If there are cameras everywhere, then FRT enabled tracking could far surpass
CSLI tracking—rather than knowing an individual’s general location, the state can see
who you were with, what you wore, and what you did in any given place.
iii. Inescapable and Automatic Nature of Its Collection
The third factor of the Carpenter test focuses on the “inescapable and automatic
nature of its collection.”239 This factor considers what an individual did, or did not do,
which led to the creation of the data. Inescapability refers to the real-world choices an
individual has in creating the data, while “automatic collection” refers to the digital process
which creates the data.240 In Carpenter, “inescapable” referred to an individual’s choice
to use or not use a cellphone, while “automatic collection” referred to the digital process
that created the data point, like making or receiving a phone call or a cell phone connecting
to the nearest cell tower without an affirmative act by the phone’s user. 241 The Court did
not see cell phone use in modern-day society as a choice, observing that there are more
cell phones in the United States than people242 and noting that cell phones have become
“almost a ‘feature of human anatomy.’”243
The final factor of the Carpenter test is met when applied to FRT. Being filmed by
a security camera represents an inescapable occurrence in an individual’s life. While an
individual may be able to escape being captured on camera by choosing a certain route,
using an alternate entrance to a business, or wearing a sombrero, once camera saturation
reaches a critical mass, being spotted on camera will become unavoidable. While an
individual can choose whether or not to carry a cell phone—though the Court does not see

238. James Pasley, I documented every surveillance camera on my way to work in New York City, and it
revealed a dystopian reality, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-many-securitycameras-in-new-york-city-2019-12 (documenting how many surveillance cameras a New York City based
journalist encounters on his daily commute).
239. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
240. Ohm, supra note 212, at 376–77.
241. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
242. Id. at 2211.
243. Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385).
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this as real choice244—an individual has much less autonomy and control over where
cameras are mounted and ways to avoid being seen, scanned, and tracked by FRT. Though
our society has come to rely on cell phones, they represent a modern convenience which
an individual could reasonably go without and survive. The same choice does not exist
when it comes to leaving one’s home to work, eat, or socialize. FRT poses a more
inescapable mode of surveillance than CSLI posed in Carpenter because cameras are more
difficult to avoid than cell phones. FRT, like CSLI, is also automatically collected. The
most distinguishable feature between the two is that the data FRT collects may have larger
holes than that of CSLI. For example, if an individual is filmed walking into their
workplace, there may not be a recording of that individual during working hours while
they are in their office. However, despite potential holes in the data generated by FRT, the
tracking capabilities are comparable to those of CSLI—inescapable, and automatic.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though the Supreme Court’s holding in Carpenter strengthens individual privacy
by expanding what constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the decision falls
short by failing to limit how far into an individual’s past the government can go in
accessing personal information generated by other forms of technology. Carpenter
demonstrates that there are technologies that present such a great erosion—and threat to—
individual privacy that they fall under the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The CSLI
in Carpenter revealed so much about an individual’s life that government access to that
information constituted a search. As facial recognition technology deployed over a wide
area camera network shares many of the same characteristics as CSLI—though more
accurate and more revealing—government access to information generated by FRT should
also be considered a search and have Fourth Amendment protection extended to it. Though
this expansion of the Carpenter holding would not disturb many of the alarming
applications of FRT by companies and individuals, nor disturb their ability to share
captured video with law enforcement, requiring a warrant to access information generated
by FRT would make it more difficult for police to amass a complete record of an
individual’s activity. Taylor Swift would retain the right to screen her concerts for stalkers
using FRT. However, government law enforcement agents would have an additional check
on their powers—“prevent[ing] ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”245
- Daniel Weatherholt*
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